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A. INTRODUCTION 
 
Brexit, however it emerges (and assuming that it will emerge), poses two key questions for 
energy governance and regulation in Scotland. Firstly, what impact might it have on Scotland’s 
energy strategy? Secondly, what are its possible UK-wide effects? 
 
B. BREXIT AND SCOTLAND’S ENERGY STRATEGY 
 
Brexit is taking place at an important stage in the development of Scotland’s energy sector.1 
Over the past ten years, there have been major shifts, driven by UK and Scottish legislation 
and government policy, to reduce reliance on fossil fuels in order to mitigate climate change. 
Building on the UK Climate Change Act 2008, the Scottish Parliament’s Climate Change 
(Scotland) Act 2009 set the ambitious statutory target of reducing Scotland’s carbon emissions 
by 80% by 2050.2  The Scottish Government will soon be introducing a new Climate Change 
(Scotland) Bill with even more challenging objectives, including increasing the 2050 target to 
a 90% emissions reduction.3 
 
As a result of technological developments and government support, there have been 
significant changes to electricity generation in particular: renewable electricity (principally 
wind turbines and historic hydro-electricity) now accounts for nearly 60% of Scotland’s 
electricity generation, with most of the rest being provided by the country’s nuclear power 
stations, which generate low-carbon - although not renewable - electricity.4  
 
Importantly, the 2017 Scottish Government Draft Energy Strategy, which will be 
finalised towards the end of the year, is also proposing the even more exacting objective that 
50% of Scotland’s energy consumption – its electricity and its transport and heating – is to be 
supplied from low-carbon, renewable sources by 2030.5 What makes achieving this goal so 
challenging is that electricity accounts for only around 20% of Scotland’s total energy demand, 
with the remaining 80% in heating and transport.6 Moreover, while the changes to electricity 
generation have gone mainly unnoticed by consumers, reforming heating and transport is likely 
to be more difficult, as it will require individual consumers both to change their behaviour and 
spend money. 
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1 Scottish Government, Draft Scottish Energy Strategy: The Future of Energy in Scotland 
(24 January 2017) 9-13, available at: http://www.gov.scot/Publications/2017/01/3414. 
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from 2015: since then, Scotland’s last coal-fired power station has closed, and the proportion generated by 
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The final form of the Scottish Government’s energy strategy remains to be seen, but it 
is doubtful that it will differ significantly from the draft version which has been out to 
consultation. As such, it is likely to be an ambitious strategy which articulates medium to long-
term targets without focusing on the technical challenges that need to be overcome in order to 
achieve its goals. This is justifiable in a broad strategy, although just how achievable the targets 
are will no doubt be a matter for debate. 
 
From an energy governance perspective, the strategy is significant in that it adds a 
further piece to the jigsaw of the Scottish Government's inter-related strategies.  In particular, 
given the big picture nature of overall Scottish Government policy, the draft energy strategy 
and Scotland's Energy Efficiency Programme (“SEEP”)7 currently fit together.  As further 
progress is made with low-carbon transition in heating and transport, however, one of the things 
for energy law and policy specialists to monitor is whether aspects of the different strategies 
(together with their governance structures and legislative instruments) continue to be 
compatible with each other, or whether they start to diverge. 
 
Given the lack of clarity on what Brexit might entail (although we now know that the 
UK may comply with EU law until 2021), it is difficult to be definitive about its possible impact 
on Scotland’s energy strategy. That said, is reasonable to think that, even in the event of a so-
called hard Brexit, it is unlikely that the broad thrust of the things that the strategy might want 
to do in relation to heating, transport and energy efficiency would be affected significantly in 
any substantive, legal sense – in the short term at least. As outlined below, however, Brexit 
may result in there being more political instability and less money to finance the low-carbon 
transition throughout the UK. There may also be less government and parliamentary time and 
resources available for energy policy-making, legislation and regulation.   
 
In this context, it may be that political and constitutional fault-lines could become more 
acute, making it more difficult to maintain the broad consensus on energy within and between 
the Scottish and UK Governments that is needed to effect significant change. While in formal 
terms many of the legislative powers which govern the main aspects of the proposed Scottish 
Government strategy are reserved to Westminster, it is also the case that the Scottish 
Government has considerable devolved competence to act in key areas such as planning. 
Despite political differences in the aftermath of the 2014 independence referendum in 
particular,8 the two governments have often been able to co-operate on energy – but will Brexit 
affect this generally positive working relationship? At this stage, it is impossible to know. 
 
That said, in this context an important issue for Scotland’s future energy strategy is 
likely to be the effectiveness of the design of post-Brexit domestic regulatory regimes for 
heating, transport and energy efficiency. With the EU having left the field, the division between 
reserved and devolved areas may become even more critical, and the work of Thomas Muinzer 
and Geraint Ellis mapping the competencies of the devolved administrations in what they call 
the “energy constitution” exemplifies what can be done to develop understanding of how to 
facilitate policy delivery.9 Analysis of this sort could also be expanded to include a wider range 
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of energy sector participants and to drill down into specific areas, such as heating and transport. 
A further issue to be grappled with is that the regulatory regime which is likely to be needed in 
the context of reforming provision for heating and transport will need to be different from the 
technocratic regime for electricity generation. This is because consumers - and changing their 
behaviour - will become a central factor, whatever emerges from Brexit. 
 
(1) The UK-wide effects of Brexit on energy 
 
As matters stand, all that can be said about Brexit with certainty is that, depending on its terms 
(which are still to be negotiated), it could have a major effect on important aspects of the UK's 
approach to energy. This section will therefore highlight the areas where Brexit may have 
particular impact: governance and finance; security of supply; and climate change and low-
carbon transition. The key points to note are as follows. 
 
(a) Governance and finance 
 
It is possible that after Brexit the UK may cease to be in the single European energy market, 
although current UK Government policy is to continue as part of it. Depending on what 
happens, there may be adverse cost implications for the UK energy sector (and therefore 
possibly consumers) and increased risks to UK energy security. 
 
Outside the EU, the UK could continue to participate in some of the European 
organisations and agreements developing international energy transmission systems.10 It 
would, however, lose its representation on the EU Agency for the Cooperation of Energy 
Regulators ("ACER")11 and will leave the European Atomic Energy Community 
("Euratom").12  
 
It remains to be seen whether the UK could have observer status at ACER, and negotiate 
some form of continued involvement with Euratom. Also in respect of ACER, the provisions 
of the EU Regulation on Wholesale Energy Market Integrity and Transparency13 ("REMIT") 
will still apply to UK-based energy suppliers delivering gas or electricity to EU Member States 
post-Brexit: they will therefore be required to meet ACER's reporting requirements and 
Member State level provision giving effect to REMIT. 
 
As a non-EU state, the UK will also lose its ability to participate in decision-taking 
under the EU Regulation on Guidelines for Trans-European Energy Infrastructure14 (the “TEN-
E Regulation”). This would, on the face of it, leave the UK out of the main EU system for the 
development of major energy projects of common interest (“PCIs”) such as interconnectors.  
Importantly, the UK could also lose EU financial support - possibly for existing UK-focussed 
PCIs as well as post-Brexit ones. A particular issue is likely to arise in respect of 
interconnection with Ireland, which currently imports its electricity and gas via the UK 
(although perhaps not for much longer).15 Once more, it remains to be seen what the EU and 
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UK may be able to agree in due course, on the assumption that, irrespective of Brexit, it is in 
everybody’s interests to continue to have a highly integrated European energy infrastructure. 
 
More specifically on the issue of finance, Brexit may have a significant impact on the 
UK.  In particular, the European Investment Bank ("EIB"),16 which has as its main focus 
lending to EU Member States, provides large amounts of finance for UK energy projects. 
Whether, how or to what extent this will continue after the UK leaves the EU is unclear, 
although it would seem obvious that as a non-Member State the UK cannot expect to receive 
the level of support that it currently enjoys. Similarly, the post-Brexit UK may, on the face of 
it, no longer be eligible for European Fund for Strategic Investment ("EFSI")17 backing (or at 
least the same level of support), and this is an important factor in attracting private sector 
finance for major energy projects. Taken together with what may be a weakening UK economy 
caused by an overall lack of certainty created by Brexit, a changed relationship with the EIB 
and EFSI has the clear potential to have an adverse effect on the financing of the UK energy 
sector.  Finally in this context, it could be argued that a post-Brexit UK might have greater 
scope for providing state aid for domestic energy projects. This would, however, depend on 
the outcome of future negotiations between the UK and EU: as matters stand, it is unclear 
whether and to what extent any trade deals which may come into effect after 2021 will require 
the UK to comply with EU state aid and competition law in the energy area.18 
 
(b) Security of supply 
 
The security of electricity supply is an increasingly important issue. Recently, the UK has come 
close to power cuts and the closure of fossil fuel power stations, together with an increased 
reliance on renewables, means that it needs to import electricity from Europe in a cost-effective 
way. It is difficult to say whether or not Brexit will have a significant impact in this context, as 
much depends on the terms of the UK's departure from the EU and future electricity pricing. 
That said, as noted above, the UK's departure from the TEN-E Regulation is likely to mean 
that it may become more difficult to develop PCIs (e.g. interconnectors to import electricity) 
that benefit the UK. 
 
In terms of the security of gas supply, it is unlikely that even a hard Brexit would result 
in an immediate risk to the UK, which has access to its own (still) extensive gas fields in the 
North Sea, and is able to import from the US and elsewhere. There is, however, a reliance on 
EU interconnectors in extremis.  So, again, if it becomes more difficult to develop PCIs post-
Brexit, this may affect the financing of new interconnectors, thereby – potentially – disrupting 
UK gas supply security. 
 
(c) Climate change and low-carbon transition 
 
Thus far, there has been little real indication that Brexit has had a significant impact on the 
approach taken by the UK to climate change and low-carbon transition. For example, the UK 
                                                     
support has also been given for the construction of a LNG terminal in Ireland.  See D. Williams, ‘Ireland pushes 
EU to assist in post-Brexit energy security’ Power Engineering International (26/7/2017), available at 
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Government has inter alia ratified the Paris Agreement, followed the advice of the independent 
Committee on Climate Change on emissions reduction, continued to provide significant 
amounts of support for renewable energy, made announcements on phasing out petrol/diesel 
vehicles and made clear on the international stage that it remains wholly committed to low-
carbon transition, notwithstanding developments in US policy which are hostile to climate 
change mitigation. 
 
Any immediate consequence of Brexit is therefore likely to be institutional and 
technical, rather than radical in policy terms.  One obvious issue, however, is that the UK's 
target for emissions reduction under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and 
the Paris Agreement is subsumed within the overall EU target.19 So, something which will have 
to be determined is whether the post-Brexit UK will have a separate emissions reduction target, 
or whether it will continue as part of the EU target in some way. 
 
In a similar (relatively) non-contentious vein, the UK's post-Brexit status in relation to 
the Emissions Trading Scheme will also require clarification. Much will no doubt depend on 
the outcome of future UK-EU negotiations, although one possibility could be to conjoin the 
EU and UK schemes, as the EU and Switzerland have just done.20 
 
C. CONCLUSION 
 
The implications of Brexit for energy governance and regulation remain uncertain: much will 
depend on the future relationship that the post-Brexit UK is able to establish with the EU. At 
this stage, however, it seems likely that the main consequences of Brexit for Scotland’s energy 
strategy and the UK energy sector as a whole will be a more uncertain political environment, 
exclusion from the mainstream of strategic EU energy governance, and fewer financial 
resources for investment and development. 
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